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The American health care system has slogged its way through an
alphabet soup of insurance acronyms—HMOs, IPAs, PPOs, and on
down the line.  More recently, it’s become stylish to lump all but
the most traditional insurance plans under the umbrella of “man-
aged care organizations” or (jumping right back into the soup)
“MCOs.”  But just what has managed care really delivered?  Has it
been the lid on the health care spending pot...or a fire beneath the
cauldron?  Perhaps both, but the record is poor, and it’s time for
some creative approaches to health insurance.
Features of Early HMOs
HMOs have grown over time.  A few plans date back to the
1920s or 30s, but enrollment prior to 1970 was negligible.
Spurred by rising health care costs, advocates persuaded
Congress to pass the 1973 HMO Act.  The Act provided some
seed money for new HMOs, but more importantly it required
large employers to offer an HMO insurance option to their work-
ers if a “federally qualified” HMO served the employment area.
Yet even federal inducements did not immediately boost enroll-
ments.
Ultimately, what attracted people to HMOs was a different
product: an insurance package that touted the merits of preven-
tion and expanded access to care by covering services that tradi-
tional insurers had excluded—routine physician visits, dental
care, prescriptions, vision services, and so on.  HMOs also popu-
larized fixed-dollar “copayments” in place of traditional “coinsur-
ance,” in which patients pay a percentage of the full price of
care.  
As HMOs attracted more members, traditional insurance plans
adopted many of the same features.  Not surprisingly, this “cov-
erage competition” altered both the structure of insurance and
the extent to which consumers were insulated from the direct
cost of care.  The line graph below shows how the average coin-
surance rates (fraction paid out-of-pocket) have changed over
time for personal health care spending and some of its compo-
nents.  These changes reflect a dramatic shift in health care
financing, away from direct payments toward third-party pay-
ments by private insurers and government.
Guess Who Pays
We shouldn’t kid ourselves into thinking that, because we now
pay a smaller share out-of-pocket, someone else is paying for
health care.  Besides copays,  most workers also pay a portion of
health insurance premiums.  Less apparent, but no less signifi-
cant, workers also forego higher wages to have the employer pay
the rest of the premium.  (This arrangement suits both parties
because wages are taxed but employer premium payments are
not.)  Our taxes also support the public programs, Medicaid and
Medicare.  Bottom line: we paid then, we pay now...just differ-
ently, and considerably more.
The decline in coinsurance rates over time does indeed matter.
Economic theory says that a lower average coinsurance rate will
increase demand, causing price, quantity, and total payments for
care to rise.  That’s precisely what has happened over time.  The
next line graph shows three indices for personal health care in
the U.S., 1960-2002.  Each index—price, quantity per capita, and
per capita spending (from all sources)—is normalized to 1.0 for
the base year (1960), helping us to see the relative rates of
growth in the three measures.  At any point in time, the index of
expenditure per capita (E) equals the product of the price (P)
and quantity (Q) indices.
Note that price (the medical CPI) and quantity (personal
health care spending per capita divided by the medical CPI) grew
at similar rates from 1960 to 1973: 4.89% and 4.35%, respective-
ly.  But following implementation of the HMO Act, prices began
to escalate sharply, rising by 7.13% per year from 1973 to 2002,
while the average rate of growth in the quantity index fell to
1.62% per year. Consistent with the observed changes in the
insurance structure, increased coverage and fixed copayments
put upward pressure on gross prices, in turn prompting utiliza-
tion controls by managed care plans.  Empirical studies also con-
firm that managed care has controlled utilization more effectively
than it has prices or expenditures.  
Interestingly, though less apparent from the graph, the average
rates of growth in per capita health care spending before and
after 1973 are quite similar (9.45% and 8.86%), suggesting that
the net effect of the “managed care revolution” has been a
change in the mix of spending increases: larger price increases
and smaller increases in quantity—not a very favorable outcome
for consumers, especially the uninsured, who bear the full brunt
of higher health care prices, forego care, or rely on “free” care
from hospital emergency rooms.  
Note, however, that the medical price index may not fully
reflect changes in the quality of health care.  If quality has
improved, higher prices could overstate the burden on con-
sumers, although frequent complaints about the system suggest
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nience, reliability—may have deteriorated, partially offsetting
any “better technology” bias.
Cross-Sectional Data
States differ in the degree to which HMOs have penetrated the
health insurance market.  The scatter diagram shows, for each
state, the HMO penetration rate and the associated level of per-
sonal health care spending per capita in 1998.  If HMOs effec-
tively control spending, we might expect a negative relationship
in the scatter, but the opposite holds.  This could mean several
things: (1) HMOs do little to contain spending, and may even
increase it, as suggested by U.S. time-series data; (2) HMOs,
seen as a cost-containment device, have found it easier to
expand in high-spending states; (3) both of the above occur, but
the inflationary effect of HMOs dominates; or (4) HMO penetra-
tion rates and per capita health spending appear positively
linked only because of some other variable that is related to
both.  In any event, the evidence that HMOs effectively control
health care prices or spending is mixed at best.  
“We Have Met the Problem...Us”
The title of our piece does little to mend the “whipping boy”
image of managed care.  But, in truth, we’ve all had a hand in
shaping the current system.  The HMO concept, with its purport-
ed emphasis on preventive care and better coordination of ser-
vices, appealed to many consumers.  But the wholesale expan-
sion of coverage, including more discretionary services, and the
dilution of incentives for consumers to monitor their use of care
and the prices charged to insurers, unleashed rapid inflation
across many health care markets.  And traditional insurers, bol-
stered by the tax exemption of employer-paid premiums, quickly
followed suit.  It’s tempting to blame special-interest legislation
for the tax exemptions, the inducements to managed care, and
other policies that enabled this dramatic restructuring of the
health care finance system.  But few consumers, employers,
health care providers, or insurers were lobbying hard against
such provisions.  And that’s still true.  
Faced with rising medical prices, people want more insurance,
not less, even though more insurance will boost prices.  Firms
want to preserve the special tax treatment of health insurance
premium payments, especially with these costs rising.  And
nearly every provider wants her particular type of care to be
more fully covered, something that larger insurers often facilitate
via their influence on state mandated coverages.  Unfortunately,
all of these wants and actions produce costlier health care and,
it seems, more complaints about the system.  Not a pretty pic-
ture.  But maybe it’s time to find solutions rather than culprits.
What’s the Answer? 
That old chestnut, the “fallacy of composition”—the notion
that what works for one may not work for all—is precisely the
problem with comprehensive health insurance.  Individually,
having more of it looks good.  Unfortunately, as coverage
expands, it inflates health care prices, prompting larger employ-
ee contributions, lower wages, and efforts to limit access to care,
thereby eroding much of the personal benefit we expected.  To
break this cycle of collective frustration, any real cure for the
health sector’s ailments needs to do several things.  
• Restore economic incentives.  Well-insured consumers
lose the incentive to monitor prices, so providers feel little need
to make the information available.  Prices clearly do matter to
uninsured consumers—witness the Internet or cross-border drug
purchases by many seniors.  Yet, citing concerns about the safety
of (U.S. produced) drugs bought from Canadian suppliers, the
federal government outlaws the purchase of drugs at lower
prices.  Similarly, the newly minted Medicare drug plan requires
authorities to pay list prices for U.S. drugs, prohibiting them
from seeking volume discounts on taxpayers’ behalf.  Such
quantity discounts are precisely how Canadian provincial gov-
ernments buy U.S. drugs at lower prices, yet Medicare is forbid-
den to bargain similarly...by an act of Congress.  Much could be
done to increase transparency and restore price discipline in
health care markets by moving away from copayments and back
toward coinsurance, requiring all health care providers to clearly
post prices, and removing bargaining restrictions.   
• Encourage better health. A growing body of research sug-
gests that more healthful lifestyles would lower the high costs of
chronic disease.  Obesity, smoking, excessive alcohol or drug
use, and inactivity all contribute to these costs.  Coupled with
sensible preventive screening, changes in personal habits can
reduce the need for medical intervention and prolonged drug
therapy.  Managed care may have done little to improve health
habits, but this does not mean that insurance cannot play a con-
structive role.  
• Be creative. For 25 years, Mendocino County (CA) schools
have offered an innovative insurance plan that rewards healthier
behavior and prudent use of care.  The employer sets aside a
target amount to pay for an initial amount of health care spend-
ing for each worker.  Insurance kicks in after the target amount
is exceeded, thereby preserving full coverage.  But those who
keep their annual charges below the target by staying healthy,
using care more wisely, or seeking better prices, are rewarded by
having the unused portion credited to their retirement plans.  
By all accounts, both the employer and employees strongly
endorse the plan, and initial concerns that workers would forego
care, but later incur even higher costs, seem to have been
unfounded. Most insurers dislike the plan, because the high-
deductible policy used to supplement the self-insurance pool
brings in lower premiums than a normal policy.  In principle,
though, even insurers could profit if the lower premiums are
accompanied by even larger reductions in claims.  The
Mendocino Plan is simple but powerful: relatively full coverage
is preserved, but consumers have a positive incentive to improve
their lifestyles, monitor their own use of services, and care about
the prices.
Carrots and Sticks
Like so many other issues, health care has become a political
football for those who occupy the opposite end zones.  Practical
answers lie in sensible, “midfield” plans that balance the finan-
cial protection of insurance with the need for patients to be good
consumers.  The latter can be accomplished by penalties, but
perhaps even more effectively by rewards.  So far, we’ve mostly
used sticks.
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